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Abstract
A relatively unexplored issue in cybersecurity science and engineering is whether there exist intrinsic
patterns of cyberattacks. Conventional wisdom favors absence of such patterns due to the overwhelming
complexity of the modern cyberspace. Surprisingly, through a detailed analysis of an extensive data set
that records the time-dependent frequencies of attacks over a relatively wide range of consecutive IP
addresses, we successfully uncover intrinsic spatiotemporal patterns underlying cyberattacks, where the
term “spatio” refers to the IP address space. In particular, we focus on analyzing macroscopic properties
of the attack traffic flows and identify two main patterns with distinct spatiotemporal characteristics:
deterministic and stochastic. Strikingly, there are very few sets of major attackers committing almost all
the attacks, since their attack “fingerprints” and target selection scheme can be unequivocally identified
according to the very limited number of unique spatiotemporal characteristics, each of which only exists
on a consecutive IP region and differs significantly from the others. We utilize a number of quantitative
measures, including the flux-fluctuation law, the Markov state transition probability matrix, and pre-
dictability measures, to characterize the attack patterns in a comprehensive manner. A general finding is
that the attack patterns possess high degrees of predictability, potentially paving the way to anticipating
and, consequently, mitigating or even preventing large-scale cyberattacks using macroscopic approaches.
2Introduction
Highly networked communication and information infrastructures built via various state-of-the-art tech-
nologies play crucial roles in modern economic, social, military, and political activities. However, such
sophisticated infrastructures are facing more and more severe security challenges on the global scale [1–4].
Earlier theoretical works focused on understanding the complex topologies of the Internet [5] and on the
likelihood of large scale failures caused by node removal in complex networks [6–10]. Recent years have
witnessed tremendous efforts devoted to mitigating and coping with increasing cybersecurity threats.
For example, attack graphs were invented to analyze the overall network vulnerability and to generate a
global view of network security against attacks [11–14]. By deploying network sensors at particular points
in the Internet, monitoring systems were built to detect cyberthreats and statistically analyze the time,
sources, and the types of attacks [15], and various visualization methods were developed to better under-
stand the result of the detection and analysis [16–19]. Quite recently, a genetic epidemiology approach
to cybersecurity was proposed to understand the factors that determine the likelihood that individual
computers are compromised [20], and the general concept of cybersecurity dynamics was introduced [21].
Attack traffic analysis were mainly done in the field of Intrusion Detection System (IDS), the cy-
berspace’s equivalent to the burglar alarm. IDS has become one of the fundamental technologies for
network security [22]. There are three approaches to building an IDS: (1) signature or misuse detec-
tion, (2) anomaly detection, and (3) hybrid or compound detection. In particular, signature detection
technique is based on a predefined set of known attack signatures obtained from security experts. The
system observes the activities of subjects and alarms if their behaviors match the malicious ones in the
attack signature set. Both host-based [23, 24] and network-based [25, 26] detection systems were devel-
oped. Anomaly detection technique is based on machine learning methodologies, such as system call
based sequence analysis [27–29], Bayesian networks [30–32], principal component analysis [33–35], and
Markov models [36, 37]. The IDS monitoring capability can be improved by taking a hybrid approach
that combines both signature and anomaly detection strategies [38,39]. All these methods are often based
on data packet payload inspection and thus are difficult to perform for high speed networks. Another
limitation of these approaches is the assumption that either the attacks are well defined (i.e., signatures)
or the normal behaviors are well defined (so are the abnormal behaviors). Recently, there has been a
growing interest in flow-based intrusion detection technologies, by which communication patterns within
3the network are analyzed, instead of the contents of individual packets [40, 41]. Interestingly, a quite
recent study analyzing the data obtained from the host IDSs reveals strong associations between the
network services running on the host and the specific types of threats to which it is susceptible [20].
Making use of the plan recognition method in artificial intelligence, one can predict the attack plan from
the IDS alert information [42]. Utilizing virtual or physical networks to test these IDS techniques can be
costly and time consuming, hence, as an alternative, simulation modeling approaches were developed to
represent computer networks and IDS to efficiently simulate cyberattack scenarios [43–45]. As botnets
have become a major threat in cyberspace, cyberattack traffic patterns have also been used to understand
botnet’s Command-and-Control strategies [46–48].
In this paper, we uncover the existence of intrinsic spatiotemporal patterns underlying cyberattacks
and address the important question of whether certain such attacks may be predicted or anticipated in
advance. The overwhelming complexity of the modern cyberspace would suggest complete randomness
in the distribution of cyberattacks and, as a result, the intuitive expectation is that attackers’ behaviors
are random and attacks are unpredictable. However, our discovery of the spatiotemporal patterns and
quantitative characterization of the predictability of these patterns suggest the otherwise. In particular,
distinct from previous works on cyberattack analysis, our efforts concentrate on analyzing the macroscopic
properties of the attack traffic flows using a data set of cyberattacks available to us. Especially, the data
set recorded attacks on 491 consecutive victim IP addresses (sensors) in 18 days. The IP addresses can
thus be regarded, approximately, as a variable in space. An attack is regarded as an event occurring
in both space and time, and we speak of events in spatiotemporal dimensions. This is much more
comprehensive than the analysis of the individual time series obtained from sampled IP addresses or the
time series obtained by treating the IP addresses as a whole [49–57]. Our results reveal, for the first time,
that robust macroscopic patterns exist in the seemingly random cyberspace: majority of the attacks are
governed by a few very limited number of patterns, indicating that cyberattacks are mainly committed
by a few types of major attackers, each with unique spatiotemporal characteristics. More specifically,
the patterns can be divided into two types: deterministic and stochastic. The emergence of deterministic
patterns implies predictability, which can potentially be exploited to anticipate certain types of attacks
to achieve greater cybersecurity. We characterize the predictability of attack frequency time series based
on information entropy [58]. Our results suggest a surprisingly high degree of predictability, especially
for the IPs under deterministic attack. Effective algorithms can then be developed to predict the future
4attack frequencies. We also develop methods to evaluate the inference probability between the attack
frequency time series based on series similarity, which may allow us to plant much fewer attack probes
into the Internet while still achieving effective monitoring. The stochastic patterns can be quantified
using the flux-fluctuation law in statistical and nonlinear physics [59–68]. Our findings outline a global
picture of how cyberattacks are initiated and distributed into the Internet. This will be of potential value
to the development of defense strategies against cyberattacks on a global scale.
Results
Existence of IP address blocks sharing similar attack patterns and common backgrounds. We define at-
tack frequency w(t) as the number of attacks received by a victim IP per time unit ∆t. Figure 1 shows
the time series w(t) from all the victim IP addresses for ∆t = 1000 seconds. Surprisingly, instead of
overwhelming randomness, we observe substantial regularity: the IP-space can be unequivocally divided
into distinct colored blocks, where the amplitudes of the time series within each block are approximately
of the same order of magnitude, but the amplitudes from different blocks vary considerably. Note that,
within each block, the time series w(t) are approximately synchronized, which correspond to a particular
attack pattern. For different attack patterns, there exists a common background in the different IP sec-
tors. For example, about half of the IP addresses (from 1 to 246) belong to the background of aqua block
[w(t) ∼ 101.5], in which yellow, orange, and red patterns all exist, while all other IP addresses possess a
dark-blue background [w(t) < 100.5] with a number of vertical light-blue lines going through them.
To further investigate the properties of each pattern, we concentrate on a small time period, as shown
in Fig. 2. Firstly, under much higher time resolution (∆t = 10sec), the large number of vertical light-
blue lines in Fig. 1 (a) become curves evenly distributed along the t axis and occupying about half of
the IP-space (from 1 to 246). These curves are approximately parallel lines within the same IP region
but with different slopes in different IP regions (the sloped lines become visually vertical under low
time resolution or large observational time period). It is these curves that form the aqua background
throughout the upper half of the IP space in Fig. 1. Secondly, all the light-blue curves exist on a dark-
blue background with three vertical light-blue lines appearing throughout the entire IP-space, indicating
a common background covering every single IP address on which other attack patterns are superimposed.
We call the vertical lines “walls,” which represent the level of simultaneous attacks on each victim IP and
5Figure 1: Time series of attack frequency w(t) for all IP addresses. (a) Spatiotemporal represen-
tation of attack frequencies w(t) of all IP addresses on a logarithmic scale, where the x-axis and y-axis
are, respectively, time t and IP address index from 1 to 491 (top to bottom). The IP region 1-246 is
denoted as the aqua background, where each of the four IP regions (19-31, 35-47, 50-130, and 131-191)
exhibits a particular attack pattern that is overlayed on the background. The IP region 247-363 possesses
an attack pattern that is overlayed on the dark-blue background lying under the entire IP-space. (b)
Three-dimensional presentation of the attack frequency w(t) on a logarithmic scale. The “walls” of unity
height are not visible on the logarithmic scale, but higher “walls” are visible in the IP region 364-491
[corresponding to the vertical light-blue lines on the bottom dark-blue background in (a)], which actually
occur in the entire IP-space but are mixed with other patterns. The time resolution is ∆t = 1000 seconds.
6Figure 2: Time series of attack frequency with higher time resolution. Time range: t = 86200
to 86600. Time resolution: ∆t = 10 seconds. (a,b) Two- and three-dimensional representations of the
attack frequency w(t) for the entire IP-space on a linear scale, respectively.
are visually similar to walls in the three-dimensional representation, as shown in Figs. 1(b) and 2(b).
These observations have the following implications. Firstly, IP addresses in the same colored block are
attacked through quite similar patterns, and the block as a whole shows unique spatial-temporal features,
which can be effectively associated with the “fingerprint” of a particular set of attackers. For an IP block
corresponding to a particular attack pattern, since the relatively strong spatiotemporal regularity of the
pattern can only be achieved via attacks highly organized in time and space, it is reasonable to speculate
that the corresponding attacks are solely committed by a set of intimately correlated attackers, or even
one major attacker, rather than by a set of multiple independent attackers. A single major attacker is
more likely to play the role, due to the requirement of close cooperation between the attackers that may
be unrealistic. Thus, a particular type of attack patterns, or fingerprints, corresponds to a particular
major attacker. Globally, according to the limited types of attack patterns, a small number of major
attackers are responsible for almost all the attacks. Secondly, the consecutiveness of IP addresses attacked
in similar patterns reveals the way how the corresponding attackers select their targets, i.e., targeting
each IP address within a consecutive IP sector rather than distantly separated IP addresses. Thirdly, the
coexistence of multiple patterns overlaying on some identical background indicates that some IP addresses
may be under the cross fire from multiple major attackers.
Deterministic attacks. Counterintuitively, the parallel light-blue lines in Fig. 2(a) constituting the aqua
7background in the upper half IP-space show a substantial component of deterministic attack behaviors.
We speculate that each light-blue line is generated by one of the attacker’s devices, such as a zombie
computer in a botnet that launches attacks on a certain IP region with a constant sweeping speed and a
certain order with similar time intervals. Such an “organized” attack pattern makes the light-blue lines
nearly evenly distributed along the time axis, which can be regarded as deterministic attacks. Because of
the deterministic rules that the attacks follow, it is possible to predict when and where the next attack
is going to take place by identifying the ordered time interval and extrapolating the sweeping speed.
We observe that the attacker associated with a light-blue line typically attacks each IP address once
approximately within every 3 to 8 seconds. Specifically, the three different sweeping rates in the three
sub-regions of IP addresses are about 8 seconds per IP from 51 to 130, 3 seconds per IP from 131 to 191,
and 6 seconds per IP from 192 to 246. Similar deterministic attack patterns can also be observed in a
relatively narrow IP region close to the top of the IP region (IP 19-31), but in a much larger time scale,
indicated as the thicker light-green lines right below the top of Fig. 3(a). Fig. 3(b) is the enlarged graph
with the contrast slopes of the two deterministic attack patterns shown more clearly. The deterministic
attacks in the IP range 19-31 typically take about 200 to 1100 seconds per IP before switching to the
next, with the attack rate of about once per second.
The “wall” attacks in the dark-blue background show another type of deterministic attack patterns
[Figs. 1 and 2], which are instantaneous attacks to each IP that can be observed with time resolution
of ∆t = 1 second. However, when a higher time resolution is used, e.g., ∆t = 10−3 second, the “wall”
attacks are found to occur one after another in the order of the IP index. Fig. 4 shows two typical types
of “wall” attacks. For the first type, attacks are performed exactly once on each IP in the order of IP
index but with time delays of the order of 10−2 second. This is the most frequently observed walls with
unity height in the data set, while close occurrence of several “wall” attacks induces a higher wall when
larger values of ∆t are used. The second kind of “wall” attacks shown in Figs. 4(b) and 4(c) consists of
5 consecutive attacks on one IP before skipping to the next, strictly in terms of the IP order.
The three different deterministic attack patterns observed in Fig. 3, i.e., the thick green lines in IP 19-
31, the background in IP 1-246, the “wall” attacks over the whole IP space, all sweep the IP space strictly
in order but with time scales differing by orders of magnitude. The multiscale behaviors associated with
the deterministic attack patterns are crucial for understanding and predicting attacks in the cyberspace.
Flux-fluctuation relation and stochastic attack. Recently there has been a great deal of attention to the
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Figure 3: Deterministic attack pattern on different time scales. For time resolution ∆t = 10
seconds and IP region 1-250, (a) deterministic attack pattern in a relatively large time scale: the sloped
light-green lines in the IP region 19-31, where the time range is t = 38000 to 42000, (b) enlarged section
between the two vertical pink lines in (a) in the time range from t = 39500 to 40000, which provides a
time-scale comparison between two types of deterministic attack patterns.
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Figure 4: Deterministic attack pattern of “walls”. For time resolution ∆t = 10−3 second, (a) one
type of “wall” attacks over the entire IP space, with each IP receiving one attack. The time delays for the
attacks to reach the targeted IP addresses exhibit three distinct values, separating the dots in this panel
into three lines. (b) A different type of “wall” attack with different delay, and (c) enlarged section in the
small red square in (a). Five consecutive attacks on each IP occurred before the next IP is attacked.
9flux-fluctuation relations in complex networked systems with stochastic transportation dynamics [59–68],
where the flux w(t) of a node is the amount of goods or the number of data packets that it transmits per
time unit at time t, and the standard deviation σ of w(t) corresponds to the fluctuation. The following
flux-fluctuation relation holds when the traffic system evolves under a given external drive [66]:
σ =
√
〈w〉 +
(
σ2ext
〈W 〉2 −
1
〈W 〉
)
· 〈w〉2, (1)
where 〈w〉 is the time average of flux w(t), 〈W 〉 is the time average of the external drive W (t), and
σext denotes the standard deviation of W (t). If the external drive W is approximately a constant, i.e.,
σext ≈ 0, or if W follows the Poisson distribution (σext = 〈W 〉), then σ ∼
√
〈w〉. However, if the external
drive has large fluctuations, the relation becomes σ ∼ 〈w〉.
Our key idea is that the stochastic component of cyberattacks can be characterized as a flux distri-
bution processes among all the IP addresses. Using the flux-fluctuation relation, we can identify and
distinguish the patterns of the external drives. Fig. 5(a) shows the flux-fluctuation relation on a double
logarithmic scale, where the attack frequency w(t) of a victim IP corresponds to its flux, and the total
number of attacks on a certain IP region is regarded as the external drive M(t). We observe that a
substantial part of the flux-fluctuation relation follows the scaling σ ∼
√
〈w〉 (with slope 1/2 on the
logarithmic scale), while a small portion follows the scaling σ ∼ 〈w〉 (with slope 1). These results suggest
that cyberattacks share some intrinsic common features with stochastic transportation dynamics. The
flux-fluctuation theory can then be used to analyze the stochastic components of cyberattack patterns.
From Fig. 5(a), we see that the flux-fluctuation relation for the most heavily bombarded IP region
(35-47, see Fig. 1) displays the unity slope, indicating a non-Poisson type of external drive with strong
fluctuations. The IP region under mostly deterministic attacks (IP 192-246, the aqua background with no
other overlayed attack patterns) corresponds to only one dot in the flux-fluctuation diagram, establishing
the deterministic nature of the attack without any randomness. Figure 5(b) shows the σ-〈w〉 relation for
the dark-blue background with no overlayed attack patterns, where we obtain the relation σ =
√
〈w〉
by removing the deterministic attacks. This is mainly due to the sparsity of attacks associated with the
dark-blue background. That is, without walls, mostly only one attack was received in the corresponding
IP region within each time unit. We thus have W = 1 or 0. The average flux per unit time for one given
IP is 〈w〉 ≤ 1/N , with N being the size of the IP region. For observation with T time units, the number
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Figure 5: Flux-fluctuation relation. For time resolution ∆t = 10 seconds, 〈w〉-σ relations (a) for each
IP in the IP space, (b) for IP regions 247-257 and 364-491, and for each IP in the dark-blue background
with walls (red circles) and without walls (blue squares), (c) for IP region 258-363 with (red circles) and
without (blue squares) walls. The blue dashed lines in (b) and (c) have the slope 1/2.
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of time units with W = 1 is denoted by t. We have
σ2ext = 〈W 2〉 − 〈W 〉2 =
t
T
−
(
t
T
)2
= 〈W 〉 − 〈W 〉2. (2)
Substituting this relation into Eq. (1), we obtain
σ =
√
〈w〉+
( 〈W 〉 − 〈W 〉2
〈W 〉2 −
1
〈W 〉
)
〈w〉2 =
√
〈w〉 − 〈w〉2 ≈
√
〈w〉. (3)
When deterministic attacks such as those represented by the walls are included, the fluctuation becomes
σ′ =
√
(t+ twall)
T
−
(
t+ twall
T
)2
=
√
t+ twall
T
−
(
t+ twall
T
)2
=
√
〈w′〉 − 〈w′〉2, (4)
where 〈w′〉 = (t+ twall)/T , and twall is the number of walls with one attack to each IP. Since twall ≫ ta,
〈w′〉2 cannot be ignored, and so the slope of the σ′-〈w′〉 relation on a double logarithmic scale is given by
ks =
log10 σ
′
log10〈w′〉
=
1
2
ln (〈w′〉 − 〈w′〉2)
log10〈w′〉
≤ 1
2
log10 〈w′〉
log10〈w′〉
=
1
2
. (5)
As shown in Fig. 5(b), walls tend to reduce the slope slightly. This example illustrates the effect of
deterministic attacks on the fluctuation of the attack flux. Similar phenomenon is observed in another
IP region (IP 258-363) where a less sparse but larger 〈w〉 scale attack pattern takes place, as shown in
Fig. 5(c).
Spatial concentration of attacks. Our analysis so far has focused on the temporal flux and fluctuation
behavior of each IP. It is useful to study the distribution of the attacks in the IP space to distinguish
the attack patterns in different IP blocks. The relation between the average attack frequency over the IP
addresses in a given region, denoted by wIP, and the standard deviation of the attacks distributed among
these IP addresses, denoted by σIP, is shown in Fig. 6, where the left and right panels correspond to the
attacks associated with the dark-blue background and with IP address block 258-363, respectively. In the
dark-blue background, attacks are sparse. The extreme case with n attacks homogeneously distributed
among N IP addresses leads to wIP = n/N , where each of n IP addresses receives w = 1 attack and the
remaining IP addresses have w = 0. The standard deviation of the attacks among these IP addresses can
12
Figure 6: Attack frequency deviation within an IP region versus the average at each time
unit for (a) the the dark-blue background and (b) IP region 258-363. The time resolution is ∆t = 10
seconds.
simply be written as
σIP =
√
n
N
− (wIP)2 =
√
1
4
−
(
wIP − 1
2
)2
, (6)
which is the equation of an ellipse. This equation matches the lower bound of the real data very well,
while any degree of inhomogeneity in the attack distribution will lead to a larger value of σIP. In addition,
for the time resolution of 10 seconds, the effect of “wall” attacks with unity height is to increase each
wIP exactly by 1, since a wall introduces one attack to each single IP. However, the change in σIP due to
the “wall” attacks is small. Thus we observe two ellipses from real data in both Figs. 6(a) and 6(b).
The major difference between Figs. 6(a) and 6(b) is the straight line that appears only in 6(b). This
is due to the concentration of multiple attacks on a few IP addresses, leaving the remaining IP addresses
free of attacks. The extreme case is where all n attacks focus merely on one IP. Then, the average value
of wIP is still n/N , but the standard deviation becomes
σIP =
√
n2
N
− (wIP)2 =
√
N − 1 · wIP, (7)
which gives the upper bound fit (the straight line) with the real data, as shown in Fig. 6(b). Consequently,
it is the concentration of attacks that distinguishes the attack pattern in the IP region (258-363) from the
dark-blue background. We thus see that, for observational time resolution ∆t < 10 seconds in which the
attacks are sparse, the plots of σIP-wIP relation are confined in the region bounded by Eqs. (6) and (7),
13
and larger values of σIP imply that the attacks are inhomogeneous in the IP space with uneven spatial
concentration.
We conclude that the target selection scheme in the IP region 259-491 is highly stochastic due to
the lack of regular spatiotemporal pattern. Within each time unit, there are mainly two target selection
schemes: (1) all attacks are concentrated only on a single IP; (2) attacks are evenly spread over the whole
region, i.e., each attack packet is received by a different IP.
Inference probability of attack patterns. Due to the surprisingly stable similarity of the attack patterns
within an IP block, attack time sequences of frequencies on all IP addresses may be inferred from any
single sequence. High inference probability of a consecutive IP region indicates that information obtained
from one sensor (one IP) may be sufficient to capture the key features of the attack patterns in the whole
region. Thus, our discovery of the attack pattern similarity may help to reduce dramatically the number
of sensors needed to monitor the attack behavior in the whole cyberspace of interest.
A straightforward measure of inference probability is the correlation coefficient, as the time series
belonging to a similar attack pattern are likely to be highly correlated. The correlation coefficient
between two time series i and j is given by
ρi,j =
〈(wi − 〈wi〉)(wj − 〈wj〉)〉
σiσj
, (8)
where wi and wj are the attack frequencies of IP addresses i and j, and σi and σj are the corresponding
standard deviations. Fig. 7(a) shows the correlation coefficient matrix containing ρi,j for each i-j pair
with relatively low time resolution (∆t = 104 seconds). We see that relatively large correlation coefficients
appear within the IP regions corresponding to the readily distinguishable colored blocks in Fig. 1. To
further exploit the use of the correlation coefficients, we consider the IP group generated from one given
IP i by calculating the correlation coefficients between the time series from this IP and those from all
other IP addresses, ρij , over a certain threshold ρc. The sizes of the groups generated from the IP
addresses under a similar attack pattern would be close to each other. From the group size of each
IP shown in Fig. 7(b), we see that time series associated with IP addresses in different blocks behave
differently, despite the large fluctuations. The correlation coefficient, however, may not be a reliable
measure to characterize similarity and inference probability of the main attack pattern. Figure 7(c)
shows a case where the correlation coefficient works well, but an unsuccessful case is shown in Fig. 7(d)
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where the two abrupt peaks produce very low correlation coefficients among the three time series, in spite
of their similarities in regions excluding the peaks. We note that the peaks correspond to extreme events
with highly concentrated attacks. When the extreme events on different IP addresses are out of phase,
the correlation coefficient fails to reflect the similarity of the main attack pattern and can lead to large
fluctuations. Other statistical properties, such as M , the total number of attacks on a particular IP, and
〈τ〉, the average time interval between consecutive attacks, can also be used to characterize the attack
pattern similarity, as shown in Fig. 7(b). We see that the fluctuations of these quantities are much smaller
than ρij and they are thus able to better distinguish the IP addresses under different attack patterns.
Another disadvantage of the correlation coefficients is that they are sensitive to time resolution ∆t. For
high resolution (small ∆t), the reduction in the attack frequency values may make a time series so sparse
that it is dominated by random fluctuations, and this can result in a sharp decrease in the correlation
coefficients between such sparse series. For example, for ∆t = 10 seconds, ρi,j is close to 0 for almost any
i-j pairs.
To better characterize the attack patterns and overcome the sensitivity on time resolution and fre-
quency value fluctuations, we coarse-grain the time series according to the order of magnitude of their
amplitude, i.e., we replace each w(t) by a state number, X(t) = int[log10 w(t)], where int denotes the
integer closest to log10 w(t) [for w(t) = 0, we set w(t) = 0.1 so that X(t) = −1]. Based on X(t), we can
construct a Markov state transition probability matrix (MSTPM) to capture the key information about
the attack pattern on any particular IP. The entry in the matrix at the mth row and nth column denotes
the probability that the IP is in state m at t−∆t and it transitions to state n at time t. Since the length
of the time series is relatively large, the transition probabilities are robust against random fluctuations.
In addition, for IP addresses under similar attack patterns, the similarity in their state transition patterns
would hold irrespective of the time resolution. As shown in Fig. 8, IP addresses within the same attack
pattern region have similar MSTPMs, even for high resolution (e.g., ∆t = 10 second). This suggests that
MSTPMs, which can be measured via the correlation coefficients where the matrix entries are organized
into a vector according to a certain order, can be used to quantify the inference probability, as shown in
Fig. 9. We observe that the IP addresses attacked under similar patterns have relatively high correlation
coefficients, while low correlation coefficients can distinguish the deterministic from stochastic attacks.
In general, the attack frequencies of a group of IP addresses under deterministic (or stochastic) attack
can be inferred from one of them under attack of the same type.
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Figure 7: Correlation coefficients. (a) Correlation coefficient matrix associated with the IP space, (b)
total number of attacks on an IP address,M (blue), the average time interval between consecutive attacks
on an IP, 〈τ〉 (red), and the cluster size to which each IP belongs (green). The clustering threshold is set
to be 0.7 (somewhat arbitrary). (c) Time series of attack frequency for IP 155 (red), 160 (blue), and 165
(green). All three IP addresses belong to the region of the aqua background without any other overlayed
attack patterns. (d) Time series of attack frequency for IP 405 (red), 409 (blue), and 420 (green), which
belong to the region of the dark-blue background without any other overlayed attack patterns. One
abrupt peak occurs at IP 409, and another at IP 420. The time resolution is ∆t = 10000 seconds for all
four panels.
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Figure 8: Markov state transition probability matrix (MSTPMs). For time resolution ∆t = 10
seconds, MSTPMs obtained from two randomly selected IP addresses within the corresponding IP region.
See the legend of Fig. 6(a) for the eight IP regions under different attack patterns: IP addresses (a1,a2)
10 and 33, (b1,b2) 20 and 30, (c1,c2) 40 and 45, (d1,d2) 60 and 120, (e1,e2) 140 and 190, (f1,f2) 200 and
240, (g1,g2) 260 and 360, and (h1,h2) 420 and 490.
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Figure 9: Correlation coefficient matrix associated with the MSTPMs for (a) ∆t = 10 seconds
and (b) ∆t = 100 seconds.
Generally, attack frequency time series have high inference probability, which can be measured by the
correlation coefficients or the MSTPMs. The latter, however, are more reliable especially for high time
resolutions. This finding would enable one to monitor the cyberattack patterns throughout the entire IP
space of interest using fewer sensors.
Predictability of cyberattacks. Predicting future cyberattacks is an ultimate goal in investigating cy-
berattack patterns through data analysis. The degree of predictability can be characterized by the
uncertainty associated with the state transitions in the coarse-grained time series of attack frequencies,
which can be further quantified by the information entropy. Taking into account the temporal correlations
in the state transition process, we define the information entropy of IP i as
Ei = −
∑
S′
i
⊂Si
P (S′i) log2[P (S
′
i)], (9)
where Si = {X1, X2, . . . , XT } denotes the sequence of states that the time series reached for IP i, and
P (S′i) is the probability that the state sequence S
′
i appears to IP i. The information entropy Ei takes into
account both the heterogeneous probability distribution in different states and the temporal correlations
among the states. The entropy is thus able to provide a realistic characterization of the attack patterns.
The predictability Π of a state sequence is defined as the success rate that an algorithm can achieve
in predicting the sequence’s future states [58]. For a sequence with NS possible states, the predictability
measure is subject to the Fano’s inequality: Π ≤ Πmax(E,NS), where the predictability upper bound
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Πmax(E,NS) is obtained by solving the following equation
E = −Πmax log2(Πmax)− (1−Πmax) log2(1−Πmax) + (1−Πmax) log2(NS − 1). (10)
In the predictability calculation, high time resolutions, e.g., ∆t = 10 seconds, can make the series so sparse
that the overwhelming majority of the states are reduced to the “ground state” X(t) = −1 [corresponding
to w(t) = 0]. In this case, the predictability Πmax assumes artificially high values, as the future states can
trivially be predicted to be X(t) = −1, leading to a high success rate. To avoid this artifact, we need to
use moderate time resolutions, e.g., ∆t = 100 seconds or 1000 seconds. The length of the time series can
affect the value of the predictability. Predictable patterns may not be fully contained within short time
series and, hence, we evenly divide the whole time series into multiple sections, each of length of h hours.
Figures 10(a) and 10(b) show the predictability upper bound Πmax for different section lengths and time
resolutions. While longer time series (higher h) tend to be more predictable as expected, all time series
have surprisingly high predictability. There are cases where the predictability probability is over 90%,
indicating that it is possible to make correct predictions for over 90% of the cases. We observe that the IP
regions of different attack patterns in Fig. 1 have different Πmax values, and the IP addresses under each
attack pattern are approximately equally predictable. Deterministic attacks have higher predictability
than stochastic attacks for ∆t = 1000 seconds, but the opposite occurs for ∆t = 100 seconds, due to the
fact that stochastic attacks are much more sparse and, as such, a higher time resolution can introduce
overwhelmingly more ground states into the state sequence. Despite the different attack patterns, the
average predictability over all IP addresses converges to about 93% with relatively small error bars as
the section length is increased, as shown in Fig. 10(c). Figure 10(d) shows the average predictability of
the deterministic and stochastic attacks. We see that deterministic attacks systematically have higher
predictability than stochastic attacks for ∆ = 1000 seconds. Again, sparsity contributes to the relatively
high predictability (over 85% for long sections) of stochastic attacks.
Discussion
How do attackers choose their targets? From Fig. 7(b), we see that the IP addresses under a similar attack
pattern have similarM values, which means that different IP addresses in the IP region dominated by one
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Figure 10: Predictability calculated from coarse-grained time series. (a,b) Predictability upper
bound Πmax for all 491 IP addresses for various section lengths under time resolutions ∆t = 100 seconds
and 1000 seconds, respectively, where Πmax values are averaged over all sections. (c) Average Πmax versus
section length h for ∆t = 100 seconds (red circles) and 1000 seconds (blue squares). (d) Average Πmax of
the deterministic (open symbols) and stochastic (closed) attacks versus the section length h for ∆t = 100
seconds (red circles) and 1000 seconds (blue squares). In the figure, “D” denotes deterministic and “R”
stands for random or stochastic. See text for explanation on why, in the case of ∆t = 100, stochastic
attacks can have a higher predictability upper bound than deterministic attacks.
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particular attack pattern are approximately equally visited by the attackers. Due to this, we speculate
that in most cases, an attacker does not target some specific IP addresses, but a consecutive IP region.
In the case of deterministic attacks, the attacker scans a whole block of adjacent IP addresses by using
its botnet, and each IP in the targeted block has equal probability to be hit. In the case of stochastic
attacks, at each time an attack is launched, IP addresses in the targeted block have similar chances to
receive it. It may indicate that the attackers are most likely to view the targeted IP block as a black-box,
the internal structure of which may be irrelevant.
Interplay between different attack patterns. Except for the parts in Fig. 5 that show slope 1 or 1/2,
there are some parts of the data that do not exhibit a plausible scaling, which correspond to the high
attack density patterns that are overlayed on the deterministic aqua background. Figs. 2(a) and 3(b)
show that the light-blue lines change their slopes when other attack pattern are superimposed on them.
This reveals an interesting phenomenon: different attack patterns may interfere with each other. If
so, it would be of great importance to investigate how a certain type of attack pattern promotes or
suppresses the efficiency of another type, and how the attack packets differ from normal data packets
when transporting through the Internet. Making use of the suppression effect can lead to a dramatic
reduction in the transportation efficiency of the attack packets. Our work indicates that it is potentially
possible to mitigate or eliminate cybersecurity threats substantially through a macroscopic approach, a
field that requires much further efforts.
Attack pattern inference and prediction. The surprising finding that cyberattack patterns are highly
predictable encourages us to develop inference and prediction algorithms. The former can provide us with
global insights into cybersecurity based on limited information resources, and the latter would enable us
not just to get a better understanding of current cyberattack data but also help us to forecast future
cyberthreats.
Possible improvement for future IDS. The analysis on the deterministic attack reveals the possibility
for an IDS to be prepared in advance to the coming attack based on the estimation of the relatively
constant attack frequency. If we could make the IDSs in a consecutive IP region communicate on attack
information, then the sweeping speed can be estimated, which more accurately tells each IDS when shall
the next attack take place, since the adjacent victim IPs are swept by the attacker one after another in
order within a constant time interval.
About the IP information of the attackers. This paper focuses on the analysis of data obtained via the
21
victim side. In addition, with the IP information of the attackers, if possible, we would be able to further
verify our speculation that each sweeping is generated from a single IP address. The spatial distribution
of the attackers’ IPs can also be retrieved. For deterministic attack, the sweepings are targeted on
consecutive IPs, and it is very likely that a substantial part of the attackers’ IPs are also consecutive
or nearly consecutive, since those attacker could be ex-victims of the same type of attack, which have
been successfully compromised by a major attacker and are now serving as a part of its botnet. More
properties of cyberattack which can not be observed on the victims’ side could also be revealed via such
information.
Materials and Methods
The data set we analyzed was collected between 2/9/2011 and 2/25/2011 by a cyber instrument known
as honeypot (see http://www.honeynet.org). The data set contains 491 honeypot IP addresses. The
honeypot simulates vulnerable computer services corresponding to distinct TCP ports. Since there are
no legitimate services associated with these IP addresses, the traffic arriving at these ports is widely
deemed as attacks. The raw network traffic arriving at these ports was initially recorded as pcap files.
By using some standard pre-processing procedure, we reformulated the raw traffic into flows, which are
the commonly accepted representation of cyber attacks. The pre-processing procedure uses two widely
used parameters: the flow timeout time of 60 seconds, meaning that a flow expires after 60 seconds of no
more packets arriving activities; the flow lifetime of 300 seconds, meaning that a flow expires after 300
seconds. The supplementary material contains the data set, which has two columns. Each row is a tuple
(a, b), which represents that IP address a was attacked at time b at some TCP port. Since our analysis
treats an IP address as a whole, we do not distinguish the specific ports. For the purpose of protecting
privacy, the honeypot IP addresses (i.e., the first column) were anonymized via a one-to-one mapping
that also maintains their consecutiveness.
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